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ADMINISTRAMWE LAW JUGES&
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
John Paul Jones

1

Introduction
It's my Jesuit schooling, I suppose, but I feel I must begin my
remarks with some attempt at defining my subject. Of course, as those who
have attended law school know only too well, law professors on the whole rarely
feel it necessary to ensure that their audiences have some idea about what
they're talking about. In that regard, my remarks should not be taken by the rest
of my readers as a sample of what law school is all about.
I've been invited to remark on the past, present, and future of
the administrative law judge. Just what is an administrative law judge? If I start
by considering the plain meanings of the three words, I come easily to the
condusion that an administrative law judge is one who applies administrative law
to settle by some more or less formal procedure disputes between individuals and
government agendes. But AUs don't necessarily resolve cases which involve
administrative law, and lots of non-AUs do. In fact, more often than not, within
agendes, AUs forward such cases to non-AUs for resolution, sending on only a
limited record with specific findings; perhaps with, perhaps without, a suggested
resolution. 2 Meanwhile, down at the courthouse, non-AUs hear cases and

Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The text of this article is taken from
hisaddress at the annual conference and seminar of the National Association of Administrative
Law Judges, held October 16-19, 1991 in Richmond, Virginia. The author wishes to thank
Ellen Firsching and Jeremy Sohn, University of Richmond School of Law Class of 1993, for their
hard work and critical eyes in its transformation.
[Professor Jones' address is reprinted here for its lucidity and obvious merit as a brief
history of administrative adjudication in the United States. The historical perspective, however, is
that of the author and, as is the case of all material published in this Journal, does not necessarily
reflect the views of the Association.
- Ed.]
2

See par ex., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1989) (requiring federal court
enforcement of injunctions under National Labor Relations Act); 1939 Pa. Laws 2329, 2358,
§ 615-16 (de novo judicial review of commissioner's finding on suspension of driver's license).
Compare Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 740, 49 Stat. 1648, 1740 (1936 (precluding judicial
review of decisions of the commissioner of the I.R.S. on claims for tax refunds); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 15 Ch. 225, 51.52.115 (1951) (precluding judicial review of decisions by the Board of Industrial
insurance).
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apply administrative law, albeit most of the time only after an AU has heard, and
an agency representative has decided, a case.
The term Administrative Law Judge certainly sounds impressive,
more so than earlier titles applied to the same functionary like hearing officer, 4
hearing examiner, ' or deputy commissioner. 6 But it doesn't work to
distinguish the plain-clothed judges in agencies from the black-robed judges at the
courthouse. A better term, because it reaches all (or nearly all) of the group I'm
thinking about-and writing for, and none of the black-robed, artide III or other
judges who engage in administrative case deciding, is"agency judge." ' The title
agency judge says up front that its bearer isan adjudicator directly related, if only
for one case, to an administrative agency, who decides disputes involving agency
law. Indeed, in light of the widespread presumption that AUs cannot review a
statute for conformity with a constitution, nor a regulation for conformity with
enabling law, 8 the title agency judge goes a lot farther toward distinguishing
the limited body of law with which the person so identified is expected to deal
than does the broader, potentially misleading title Administrative Law Judge.

3

Compare 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) with M.S.A.P.A. § 5-102 (1981).

4See, par ex, 1913 Ohio Laws 103 § 399.

5

See Administrative Procedure Act Pub L No 404 92 Stat. 183 (1946); Pub. L. No.
337 34
Stat. 595 (1906) (establishing the Interstate Commerce Commission); Pub. L. No. 203, 38 Stat. 718
(1914) (establishing the Federal Trade Commission).
6

See Wis. Stat. § 203.36 (1891) (referring to insurance commissioner).

[Editor's Note: As many of our readers know, most federal Administrative Law
Judges, and
some state Administrative Law Judges, do wear black robes.]

8See, par ex, Bohn v. Waddell, 790 P.2d 772 (Ariz. 1990); Cal. Const. Art. 3, § 3.5;
Crocker
v. Dept. of Revenue, 652 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1982); Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 464 A.2d 785 (Conn.
1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Palm Harbor Special Fire Control Dist. v. Kelly, 516 So.2d 249
(Fla. 1987); Wronski v. Sun Oil, Co., 310 N.W.2d 321, 324 (Mich. 1981); Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Walgreen Texas Weinberger, 375 F.Supp. 1312 (D.C.N.Y. 1974), cert. den. in 424 U.S. 958,
reversed 515 F.2d 57 (administrative law judge is precluded from passing upon constitutionality
of procedures he is called upon to administer .
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I've gotten rid of the AL because it was overly indusive; now
what am I to do about the J part, which equally misleads in all those instances
where the AU's action isnot final subject to review, but only tentative, subject to
agency ratification? In such Circumstances, I think the old term "master" in the
sense of special master 9 seems more accurate than judge. It connotes for me
an agency representative directed to take evidence and recommend a decision
to somebody else. We thus can recognize two sorts of agency representative:
the judge who, for the agency at least, finally decides, and the master, who for
the agency, only recommends.
O.K., so I'm here to talk about the past, present, and future of
agency judges and masters. I'm going to report after digging in the ruins,
looking around at today's legal landscape, and finally reading my tea leaves.
What I've found is a continuing conflict between two competing but desirable
aspects of case deciding: efficiency and independence. Throughout the history
of administrative adjudication, institutional decisions about the job of the agency
judge or master have followed from the temporary primacy of one or the other
of these competing aspects.
The Confudan Adjudicating Clerk
Looking back, I came across a report of the Confucian agency
judge of Imperial China. 10 When the Middle Kingdom grew sufficiently large
and diverse, the bureaucracy of the palace created and dispatched subordinate
bureaucrats, or magistrates, to run the provinces. The magistrate enjoyed all
three of what we in the west have come to distinguish as separable
governmental powers: legislating, administering, and adjudicating. He enjoyed
those powers over every aspect of Chinese life. Only in the rarest case would his
action be reviewed by superiors in Beijing. According to Yang, the magistrate,
before long, found cause to engage a derk who was then tasked more or less

9

'The origins of the name master comes from the masters of the old English court of
chancery; the masters in chancery were permanent clerical officers of the court; one of their many
duties was hearing oral testimony. In the former English equity practice, commissioners were
specially appointed private persons who hear oral evidence in the county where the witnesses lived;
they actedpursuant to a commission of dedimus potestatem on an ad hoc basis." W. Hamilton
Bryson, Handbook on Virginia Civil Procedure, 310 (1989).
1 0

C.K. Yang, "Some Characteristics of Chinese Bureaucratic Behavior," in Confucianism in
Action 135-63 (1959).
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exdusively with hearing cases. I'll wager two considerations prompted the
magistrate to engage an adjudicating subordinate: first, a threshold of task
overload, akin to that which caused the Imperial Palace to engage the magistrate
in the first place; and second, an aversion to the menial, also akin to that which
caused the palace to delegate management of the burgs while it concentrated
on Beijing.
If Wang's account is accurate, the practice of Chinese
magistrates evidences concern by those early agency chiefs for both dedsional
effidency and dedsional independence. A particular derk assumed the duty of
hearing cases, not just any temporarily underemployed member of the
magistrate's staff. This organizational choice suggests that the magistrate desired
the effidency which comes with spedalization of function, and illustrates a simple,
but profound truth: those who hear lots of cases do so more effidently than
those who only hear one now and again.
Having designated an adjudicating derk, magistrates then
virtually confined them to the barracks. Adjudicating derks were expected to
make their household within the magistrate's compound, and the reason given
by contemporaneous reporters for such a restriction was that it insulated the
adjudicating derk from ex parte contact and pressure. Of particular concern to
the magistrates was insurance that the adjudicating derk would not be
compromised by the demands of relations for their own benefit or for that of
their benefactors or associates. Thus, the magistrate's adjudicating derk in a very
real sense "lived at the office."
One more characteristic of the Chinese adjudicating derk
deserves note: his education. As many of you no doubt recall from a history
dass, the bureaucrats of Imperial China became eligible for appointment to
government posts only after successfully negotiating a standardized and national
examination of their knowledge of Confucian theory and philosophy. A
magistrate got to be a magistrate not because of any demonstrated skill in
governing, but because of demonstrated skill in book learning. Thus, the Chinese
magistrate, who wielded enormous power in his province subject to only the
remote possibility of review, appears the ultimate generalist, lacking completely
any functional expertise.
The opposite was true of the adjudicating derk. Clerks did not
come from the dass of successful Confudan scholars but from the staff in the
magistrate's compound. A good adjudicative derk could progress to the staff of
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a more powerful magistrate. His prior office would be filled by one of his
apprentices, and the ex-apprentice would then select in turn his student and
assistant. While the would-be magistrate studied literature and faced an
examination, the would-be adjudicating derk observed hearings and learned on
the job by listening to his mentor. So, in Imperial China, a system existed
centuries ago of adjudicative specialists, relatively lacking in educational credentials
but exhaustingly schooled in the day-today work of their administrations, subject
to overruling and discipline by a dass of more highly educated but relatively
inexperienced agency heads with no reason to take an interest in the spedal
problems of regulatory case deiding. It strikes me that Imperial China offers a
useful metaphor for considering the role of education in administrative
adjudication, and I plan to return to this point later.
The Adjudicating Clerks of Chancery and the Star Chamber
Inmy Tom Swift time and transport machine of the mind, travel
forward and westward with me to the courts of the Tudor and Stuart kings of
England. " For our purposes today, the most interesting aspect of the English
history of the period is the relatively mature and independent nature of the
regular, or common law courts. Once, the power to decide cases had belonged
to the monarch personally, as had the power to make and enforce law. All who
decided cases did so as the monarch's personal stand-ins, and the monarch's
power to review case decisions was virtually absolute (with only insignificant
ancient exceptions). By the time of the Tudor and Stuart monarchs, however, the
common law courts had, to a very large extent, successfully achieved their
independence of the crown, and the verdicts of juries had achieved substantial
finality. The royal view of the best interests of the realm might or might not be
shared by common law judges with minds of their own. At the same time, the
common law courts had matured in the fashion of courts before and since to the
point where complicated rules of procedure frustrated many litigants and
obstructed timely deisions for the rest. So, buy the time of the Tudors, the
common law courts, in the eyes of the crown at least, had grown both
unmanageable and ineffident.
The royal response was to establish new tribunals, in more or
less competion with the common law courts. The most significant of these was
in the chancery, a secretariat or department of state in the palace. Its

11

J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 112-45 (1990).
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department head, the Lord Chancellor, kept personal custody of the Great Seal
of England, and, by its application, enjoyed jurisdiction over royal grants, patents,
and other licenses. Disputes related to crown property and to injuries purportedly
traceable to the crown were heard by adjudicating derks in chancery, the most
important of whom was the Master of the Rolls. All served at the pleasure of the
Lord Chancellor, and he at the pleasure of the king. Hearing procedure differed
considerably from that of the common law courts. In chancery, both presiding
derks and professional advocates were trained in the civil law prevailing
throughout the European continent, and many in that court were churchmen.
Many actions were maintained in Latin rather than in English. No jury held sway,
and the case was resolved by an order issued, at least in theory, directly from the
crown and not the court. An early hallmark of chancery, and of its less influential,
but more notorious contemporary tribunal, the Star Chamber, was the absence
of formal and restrictive rules of pleading or procedure. 2
I recount this brief history of chancery because it too illustrates
the competing attractions of independence and efficiency for those who create
adjudicative agencies. When common law courts developed a mind of their own,
the royal response was to build a new sandbox behind the palace, and install
new judges subject to executive control. When common law courts became
unwieldy, the answer was to go elsewhere in search of informal pleading and
proof. There's a lesson of historical dynamic here, and I'll return to it shortly.
There's also a contrast to be made between Confucian and
Tudor adjudicating derks. The former, as you recall, lacked formal training, but
developed professionally on the job, taking lessons from the old pros. The latter
enjoyed considerable formal training in legal theory, often worked in a foreign
language, and frequently took religious vows as part of their job. One distinction,
perhaps relevant to this difference, is the intervening rise of the professional
advocate. One could speculate that the Lord Chancellor demanded Civil law and
Latin proficiency from his adjudicative derks because he wanted to be sure that
the lawyers could not intimidate them. Trust me, I'll come back to this.
American Antecedents of the AU

12

But the evolutionary urge of adjudicative formality can always prevail over even the best of
human intentions, so, by the nineteenth century, procedural complexity had so flourished as to
incapacitate chancery, and render it the subject of Dickensian satire in his novel Bleak Hose.
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One last historical stop, barely over the horizon of the past,
delivers us in our own legal landscape. Kenneth Culp Davis, asserts that American
agency adjudicators can be traced back at least to the colonial era, pointing to
customs officers, war department clerks considering pension claims, and ship's hull
and boiler inspectors. 13 Admittedly these fellows routinely decided cases, but
whether they did so adjudicatively isa trickier question. I'm not inclined to give
every inspector admission to my society of agency masters and judges. While
each of these government functionaries decided cases, rarely, if ever, were they
expected to explicate in writing their decisional process. What distinguishes an
adjudicator from other decision making officers isthe professional obligation of
explaining her judgment.
On the other hand, considerable resistance to the concept of
the agency judge existed in both national and state courts in America into the
third quarter of the last century. When I spoke of the rivalry in Tudor England
between the common law courts and those of the crown, I neglected to report
that within a hundred years, the judges of the former, led by Sir Edward Coke,
had succeeded, by an adroit combination of lobbying and opinionating, in
reestablishing the major contours of their monopoly on case decision, and, with
the inadvertent assistance of some heavy-handed judges in both chancery and
Star Chamber, convinced Englishmen that there was something not quite
constitutional about agents of the executive branch adjudicating the rights of
Englishmen.
As a fundamental principle of state law, that prejudice against
agency judges, if not agency masters survived the American Revolution and later
flourished in both state and federal courts. I'll offer but three examples. In 1854,
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin did its part to accelerate the outbreak of civil
war by dedaring unconstitutional the federal Fugitive Slave Act which provided for
an administrative hearing before a Commissioner for Claims by slave owners that
refugees from the slave states were in fact their runaway slaves. 14 The state
court found that the United States Constitution did not permit the exercise of

133 Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 313 (1978).

14

1n re Sherman Booth, 3 Wis. 2 (1854).
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adjudicative power by agents of the Congress. 1" In 1883, the Supreme Court
of Florida held unconstitutional a statute empowering county commissioners to
hear cases and revoke or suspend liquor licenses. 16 And in 1889, the Supreme
Court of Indiana declared unconstitutional a state statute creating commissioners
to hear cases assigned by the Supreme Court on the ground that Indiana's
17
constitution did not permit the exerdse of adjudicative power by non-judges.
By then, however, the tide was dearly turning in favor of
agency adjudicators. In 1907, Roscoe Pound, a botonist from Nebraska perhaps
more widely remembered as Dean of the Harvard Law School, could rant and
rave in the Pennsylvania Law Review about all the state and federal courts which
had turned their back on ovilization by holding constitutional in more than fifty
cases statutes creating agendes with adjudicative powers. 18 Pound quoted the
French political philosopher Montesquieu: 'There is no liberty if the power of
judging isnot separate from the legislative power and from the executive power'
and dted to a similar observation by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist. 19
Pound referred to annual ABA reports for the preceding decade which had
identified at least ten new state laws each year affording adjudicative power to
executive agendes. 20 Among those Pound found most pemidous were
Irrigation Boards established to decide water rights cases, professional licensing
boards with revocation power, and boards reviewing election contests. 21

15Id. at 25-28.

16

State v. Brown, 19 Fla. 563 (1883).

17

State ex. rel. Hovey v. Noble, 21 N.E. 244 (1889).

18Roscoe Pound, "Executive Justice," 55 U. Pa. L. Rev. 137 (1957).

19

20

1d.

d. at 139.

21id. at 141-42.
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What marks the appearance of the American agency master
at the national level is a federal statute in 1906 establishing twelve permanent
positions in the Interstate Commerce Commission with the title "spedal
examiner." 2
The ICC itself was only nineteen years old when its
commissioners persuaded Congress that (like Chinese magistrates) they needed
the authority to delegate case deciding to subordinate spedalists. By 1941, the
attorney general could say:
No one in the Commission has power to substitute his judgment for that
of the examiner in the preparation of the proposed report. If the
examiner chooses to depart from all the precedents established by
Commission decisions, he is free to do so and no one can stop him.
The examiner's position in this respect islike that of the trial judge; the
appellate court can reverse the trial judge, but cannot interfere in the
making of his initial deision. 23
From the turn of the century through the new deal to the
present, the growth in the number of administrative agendes, state and federal
with adjudicative powers has been abundant to say the least. As I come over the
historical horizon into the present, I begin to report a familiar story, largely but not
completely federal. The federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 24
afforded agency masters and agency judges considerably greater independence,
limiting the discretion of their agendes in hearing officer selection and largely
eliminating it with respect to hearing officer compensation and discipline, and
permitting their removal only for good cause. The trend toward greater
independence and enhanced prestige continued in 1978, when amendments to
the federal APA changed the "hearing officer' into the "administrative law
judge." 25

2 2

Pub. L. No. 337, 34 Stat. 595 (1906).

2 3

Davis, supra note 11, at 314 (quoting Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc. Monograph, ICC
27
(1941)).

24

Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).

25Pub. L. No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183 (1978).
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Contemporary Challenges for the Professional Adjudicator
Since then, two unsuccessful attempts to limit the independence
of federal agency masters and judges deserve at least passing notice. The first
was a pair of legislative proposals to establish a system of performance review for
AUs, in order to hold them accountable for their adjudicative performance, and
thus to enhance bureaucratic effidency. After the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978, 26 most federal employees are subject to disdpline for unacceptable
performance-but not AUs, who were explidtly excepted from the act. 2 But
bills introduced in 1979 28 and 1980 ' would have authorized AU
performance assessment in either the Office of Personnel Management or the
Administrative Conference of the United States. Both expired with the final
adjournment of the 96' Congress.
The second attempt to put a tighter rein on AUs occurred in
the federal agency employing the greatest number of agency judges and masters,
the Social Security Administration. Beginning in the late seventies, SSA asserted
the authority to demand of AUs conformance to quotas or goals. o Perhaps
the most notorious phase of this campaign was known as the Bellmon Review
Program. While that particular effort has been abandoned, the yearning of SSA
to assert decisional production controls remains palpable. The pendulum of
agency adjudication philosophy continues its motion between independence and
effidency.

26Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978).

275 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D) (1982).

2 8

See S. 755, 96th cong., 1' Sess. (1979) (vesting responsibilities in a peer review panel under
O.P.M.'s aegis).
2 9

See S. 262 9 6 'h Cong.. 1'" Sess. § 209(b)(1)( 1980) (vesting performance evaluation
responsibilities in ACUS review panels composed of AL s from agencies other than that of the
reviewed ALJ); H.R. 6788, 9 6th Cong., 2' Sess. (1980) (vesting responsibility in a presidentially
appointed ACUS Performance Review Board).
30

See generally, D. Coffer, Judges, Bureaucrats, and the Question of Independence: A Study
of the Social Security Administration 4earNg Irocess k1t).
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The modem history of state agency judges and agency masters
ismore difficult to chart. Certainly, the two most important milestones have been
the publication of Model State Administrative Procedure Acts in 1961 and
1981, 3 and the provision in the latter of the central panel for administrative
law judges. 32 The two statutes have asserted a strong but welcome influence
on state law that has produced a convergence welcome more for what it says
about our common notions of due process and government in the open than for
what assistance it affords interstate administrative practice.
The central panel idea has, by my last count, caught on in ten
states and the Big Apple. " It is under active legislative consideration in several
other states, induding my own, Virginia. Our budget problems form the most
obvious barrier to its adoption, despite the fact that states which have already
adopted the central panel approach report savings directly traceable to its
adoption. The essence of the concept isthat, by statute, the agency judge and
agency master are delivered from the various regulatory and assistance agencies
of state or city government and gathered together in an office of administrative
hearings, a fire station of their own. There they sit until the bell rings and they
are dispatched to conduct a hearing. The regulatory or assistance agency
charged with conducting the hearing has little or no control over recruiting,
individual assignment, retention, or compensation. In some central panels, there
is no sub-specialization; the same administrative law judge may hear a nurse's
license revocation case one day and a public utility rate case the next. In other
states, subject matter and/or geographic range permit sub-specialization of the
central panel judges. Most, but not all, central panel AUs enjoy some form of
job protection or civil service status. Most, but not all, central panel AUs are

31Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 1961 Act; Model State Administrative Procedure
Act, 1981 Act.

32

33

M.S.A.P.A., 1981 Act § 4-301.

California Colorado, Florida, New Jersey, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri,
Tennessee, Washington; See Malcolm Rich, The Central Panel System and the Decisionmakinq
Independence of Administrative Law Judqes: Lessons for a Proposed Federal Proqram, b W.
New Ing. L Rev. 43 1984), and Malcolm Rich and Wayne Brucar, i he Lentral Panel System for
Administrative Law Judges: A Survey of Seven States (1983), reprinted in II Journal ot the National
Association oT Administrative Law Judges, NO. 2, p. 39.
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lawyers. A little gem of a study on the first eight state central panels has been
published by Malcolm Rich and Wayne Brucar. 34 I recommend it for details.
One other noteworthy state law development. Two states,
Maine and Missouri, have gone to the extreme of taxing the power of final
decision away from their administrative agendes entirely and pladng it in an
administrative court of limited jurisdiction. s In these states, the AU is
unquestionably an agency judge and not just an agency master, because her
decision is finaksubject only to appellate review in the administrative court.
Senator Norris tried the same thing at the federal level in 1929 when he
sponsored a bill to create a United States Court of Administrative Justice. 36
That bill failed, as did several attempts by Senator Logan to do the same thing in
the 1940s, "' and the Hoover Commission's proposal for an Administrative
Court of the United States in 1955. "
For five years, Senator Howell Heflin has been urging a central
panel for federal administrative law judges. The current form of his proposal is
found in Senate Bill 826. 3 He proposes something called the United States
Administrative Law Judge Corps. His bill incorporates the ideas of the National

3 4

1d.

35Mo. Ann. Stat. § 621.045 (Vernon 1988); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1151 (West 1964).

36S. 5154, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939).

37

S. 915. H.R.a6324, 76 t aCon.
Establishing
aw
Eng. L. Kev. b/1,
/67 (19 4).
38

1 Sess.(1939). See Victor W. Palmer and Edwin Bernstein,
as an Independent Corps: The Heflin Bill. 6 W. New

Comm'n on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,

Report to the Congress Vol. VI, at 84 (1955).

395. 826, 102

'

Cong., 1" Sess. (1991).

84 h

Cong., 1" Sess.,
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Conference of Administrative Law Judges (ABA), and is endorsed by, among
other groups, the Administrative Conference of the United States. 4
The Heflin bill provides for Presidential appointment of a Chief
AU with the advice and consent of the Senate, and dMdes the corps of AUs into
seven functional divisions. One division would handle communications,
transportation, and energy cases; another labor relations; a third, health and
benefits. AUs presently employed by agendes like the Department of
Transportation, the NLRB, or Social Security would be transferred by the new law
into the appropriate dMsion of the corps. A coundl made up of the chief AU
and the seven division heads would do the hiring of new AUs, choosing from
among candidates screened by the Office of Personnel Management.
Performance evaluation would occur, but through a system of peer review at the
hands of other AUs.
The Heflin bill adroitly balances effidency and independence.
The AU is finally out from under the agency, but, in exchange, she becomes
accountable for her work product and habits. It sounds great to me, but fails to
get three cheers from the federal AUs themselves. The SSA bunch, not
surprisingly, thinks it's a great idea, but the AUs of other agendes don't. 41
Some of the nay sayers make it dear enough that they are uninterested in
throwing in their lot with the gang from SSA, which by sheer number would
dominate the corps. Judge Zankel of the NLRB offered some less sef-serving
reasons for withholding his support from the bill in an artide produced for a
symposium at the Western New England School of Law; they boil down to the
condusion that it ain't broke, so it don't need fixin'. You can find his and the
other papers on the notion of a central panel reproduced in Volume 6 of
Western New England's Law Review.
The present landscape contains another interesting idea working
its way to the surface of federal bureaucratic consdousness: uniform procedures
in formal hearings at the various federal agendes. The Administrative Conference
of the United States issponsoring a working group of AUs, members of the bar,

40

41

[And this Association-Ed.]

See Norman Zankel, A Unified Corps of Federal Administrative Law Judges is Not Needed,
6 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 723 (1984); Debra Cassens Moss, "Judges Under Fire: AU Independence
at Issue, ABA Journal, Nov. 1991, at 58-59. (reprinted infra, p. 35)
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and others in an effort to develop a set of model procedures for future adoption
by federal agendes conducting formal hearings. The draft outline indudes rules
for such issues as time computation, intervention, discovery, settlement, evidence,
motions, and so on. An interesting aspect of the endeavor isthat the Conference
and the working group expect only to produce model rules, recommended for
agency acceptance, not legislatively mandated.
Only a few states have attempted to standardize hearing
procedures. Indeed, as far back as 1942, a Commission to Study Administrative
Adjudication in the State of New York under Robert Benjamin took the position
that standardized procedures would be ineffident in light of the vast differences
among agency adjudicative systems. 42 Among the states which have
standardized formal hearing procedures, the central panel states comprise a dear
majority.
Uniform procedures, however, need not be inextricably linked
with the central panel, although the bill before Virginia's General Assembly
provided for both, 4' and the Heflin bill empowers the corps to make
regulations "appropriate for the effident conduct of the business of the
corps." "4 If the Heflin bill becomes law and the Administrative Law Judge
Corps becomes a reality, the model rules will be there for adoption by the corps.
If the Heflin bill fails, the model rules will still be there for adoption by each
agency on its own. They may not be joined at the hip but uniform hearing
procedures seem to me likely to inspire the most ardent support from AUs
moving from one agency to another as case assignments dictate.
So the present contains two interesting frontal systems moving
across the expanse of federal administrative law. Both reflect reforms already in
place in several states. But when the elephant moves, everybody pays attention,
so the success of the Heflin bill and the Conference's model rules project isbound
to have ramifications outside Washington. Details at eleven.

4 2

4 3

Commission to Study Administrative Adjudication (1942).

Supra note 32, at .

44S. 826, supra note 38, at § 598(c)(6)(d)(5).
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Back to the Future
What's left is my promise to look into the future. I have two
predictions I'd like to make, one based on a relatively unknown case in the federal
district court over in Charlottesville, and the other purely on my own intuition
about the status imperatives of bureaucratic life.
First, let me call to your attention Judge Michael's deision in
Mowbray v. Kozlowski. " In that case, the Mowbrays challenged Virginia's
Medicaid eligibility regulations, arguing that they conflicted with the federal Social
Security Act ' they were supposed to implement. The court agreed, but what
I found most interesting was another issue raised by the Mowbrays. They
claimed that their right to procedural due process under the United States
Constitution had been violated by Virginia's Medicaid Eligibility Appeals Board,
which had refused to hear their arguments that the regulations applied to deny
them benefits were invalid by virtue of their conflict with Sodal Security Act. The
Board had ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain attacks on the regulations
it was established to enforce. Everybody in Judge Michael's court seemed to
agree that this was a settled principle of administrative law, but that didn't stop
Judge Michael from concluding that it nevertheless noted a due process violation.
Judge Michael wrote:
It is true that administrative process, plus judidal review, may
equal Due Process. Thus it is possible that a system could be
set up such that an agency could prevent argument on federal
law and require the appellant to pursue review in federal or
state court on the issue of the legality of the state rule. While
possible, it is not the most efficient allocation of resources.
Allowing appellants to raise the issue before the state agency
gives the state the first crack at considering the issue and
perhaps bringing state regulations into compliance. A hearing
officer is not bound to accept the appellant's argument;
however, making the agency aware of a potential conflict may

45 724 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Va. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 914 F.2d
593 (1990).

4642 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1396.
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well prevent the expense of litigation and encourage
thoughtful, internal review.
Now, after you think about it a moment, you'll find all sorts of
holes in Judge Michael's reasoning. First, ifdue process doesn't require it (and he
agrees it doesn't), then the state and its AU are free to withhold a hearing as to
the underlying legality of the rules the AU has been told to apply. Second, even
ifthe AU refuses to rule on the validity of the regulation, the issue isnevertheless
preserved in the record and therefore isjust as loudly brought to the attention of
the agency which then has the first opportunity to correct its mistake as
Judge Michael prefers. So, even if he hadn't prefaced his remarks on this point
with the admission that they were dictum, Judge Michael would still be vulnerable
to a cranky appellate court.
But the idea really does reach out and grab ya, doesn't it-the
idea that there is really no good reason for an AU to refuse to consider the
validity of the regulation or even the statute she's been assigned to administer?
Sure, due process and preemption can be described as subtle areas of
Constitutional law, but they are child's play in comparison with regulatory thickets
like those to be found in the SSA, so there is no inherent obstade. If the only
justification for saying save it for a reviewing court is the administrative
convenience of keeping it simple for the AU, how can that outweigh making it
more burdensome for the assistance applicant?
Watch this space for future developments. I predict that in our
lifetime courts will begin to insist that a party before an AU be entitled to raise
all daims which she may later raise on appeal. The courts will no doubt articulate
a basis for this demand by reference to due process and abstention doctrine, but
what will really drive the new case law will be the reviewing court's self interesthaving the constitutional and statutory challenges aired in the administrative
hearing, resolved by the AU, and ratified by the agency means less work for the
reviewing court.
Predicting that AUs will have to become Constitutional scholars
allows me to segue nicely into my second prediction and final remarks. While the
future status of the AU will continue to depend on the pendular motion of
organizational policy between adjudicative independence versus administrative
effidency, I have little doubt that the barriers to entry into the corps will continue
to rise. Expect bar membership to appear with greater frequency among the
prerequisites for assignment as an AU. First, the output of law schools
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guarantees a plentiful supply of trained lawyers, and trained lawyers are
appearing with ever greater regularity in front of the AU. Second, the market is
in decline, and lawyer legislators can be expected to take care of their own.
I do not think that a law degree, much less bar membership,
isa necessary prerequisite for adequate or even superior performance as an AU.
After all, how much of what law school teaches transfers to the hearing process?
Some of Administrative Law, some of Evidence, some of Trial Procedure, and a
bunch of Legal Writing. But Administrative Law isalmost always overwhelmingly
about federal law and only a little bit about the formal adjudication aspect of it.
Most of Evidence isrules which have no place in a hearing without a jury, and
the same istrue about trial practice. Even if Judge Michael's view prevails, only
a small portion of Constitutional Law touches on procedural due process. When
I add it up by course content and credit hour, I figure I'm talking one semester
of law school transferrable to administrative adjudication. Five semesters of the
rule against perpetuities, public stock offerings, community property division, and
my tax exempt basis in the proceeds from a sale don't seem too important to an
AU.
You might give me the process speech, about how sitting in
those other classes nevertheless develops a lawyer's mind and a lawyer's pen.
Even if I agree, it seems that the burden on those requiring law school isto show
that three years at more than 10,000 a year isthe most efficient way to train
somebody for a different job entirely. But, nobody is presently offering an
afternative program for training AUs as AUs instead of training AUs as lawyers
first, so the law schools win by default, and those intent on making all AUs
lawyers are bound to win. But what if there were a national academy for AUs,
like there isfor law enforcement agents? Couldn't it teach fundamental presiding
skills in a year or less to AUs with backgrounds other than law? And do it both
better and cheaper?
When it opens for its first dass, will someone stop by the
bookstore and buy me a sweatshirt? Thank you.

